SCADA Honeynets: The attractiveness of honeypots as critical infrastructure security tools for the detection and analysis of advanced threats by Wade, Susan Marie
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2011
SCADA Honeynets: The attractiveness of
honeypots as critical infrastructure security tools
for the detection and analysis of advanced threats
Susan Marie Wade
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wade, Susan Marie, "SCADA Honeynets: The attractiveness of honeypots as critical infrastructure security tools for the detection and
analysis of advanced threats" (2011). Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 12138.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/12138
 
SCADA Honeynets: The attractiveness of honeypots as critical infrastructure security 
tools for the detection and analysis of advanced threats 
 
by 
 
Susan Marie Wade 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
 
 
Co-majors: Computer Engineering, Information Assurance 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Doug Jacobson, Major Professor 
Thomas E. Daniels 
Diane Rover 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2011 
Copyright © Susan Marie Wade, 2011. All rights reserved 
 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................... vii 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... viii 
CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2.  BACKGROUND ............................................................................................ 4 2.1 SCADA System Origins & Architecture ................................................................ 4  2.2 SCADA Systems & IT Convergence ....................................................................... 6 2.3 Security Implications for SCADA System/IT Convergence ............................. 7 2.3.1 Security Challenges Facing Modern SCADA Systems .............................. 7 2.3.2 Risk & Response .............................................................................................. 9 2.4 Honeypots & Honeynets ....................................................................................... 11 2.5 SCADA Networks & Honeypots – Related Work .............................................. 16  2.5.1 PLC Honeynet Project ................................................................................. 16  2.5.2 Digital Bond ................................................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 3.  DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................. 18 3.1 Design ....................................................................................................................... 18  3.1.1 The Honeynet from the Outside In ........................................................... 18 3.1.1.1 From the Adversary’s Perspective ............................................. 18 
iii 
 
3.1.1.2 From the Administrator’s Perspective ...................................... 20 3.1.2 The Target VM ............................................................................................... 21 3.1.3 The Honeywall VM ........................................................................................ 23 3.2 Implementation ...................................................................................................... 23 3.3 Implementation Issues .......................................................................................... 26 
CHAPTER 4.  TESTING ..................................................................................................... 27      4.1 Data Collection Process .......................................................................................... 27 
     4.2 Testing Goals ............................................................................................................ 29 
     4.3 Vulnerabilities Specific to PLCs, VxWorks Debugger and SNMP .................. 29 4.3.1 PLC ................................................................................................................... 29 4.3.2 VxWorks Debugger ....................................................................................... 30 4.3.3 SNMP ............................................................................................................... 30      4.4 Observations & Analysis ........................................................................................ 31 4.4.1 General and SCADA Specific Attacks – SCADA Honeynet ..................... 31 4.4.2  Attacks - IT Network ................................................................................... 33 
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK ......................................................... 35 
APPENDIX 
SNORT ALERTS – SCADA HONEYNET ................................................................... 39 
SNORT ALERTS – IT NETWORK .............................................................................. 40 
MODBUS VULNERABILITIES ................................................................................... 43    
INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE VIRTUAL PLC HONEYNET ........ 50 
iv 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 55 
  
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 Table 2.1 Honeypot Types ................................................................................................ 12 Table 3.1 Recommended and Actual Specifications for SCADA Honeynet ............. 24 Table 4.1 Modbus/TCP Snort Rules ................................................................................ 28 
  
vi 
 
 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2.1 Typical SCADA System Architecture ............................................................. 5 Figure 2.2 Remote Points of Entry into SCADA Systems ............................................ 10 Figure 2.3 Sample Honeyd Configuration File .............................................................. 14 Figure 2.4 Network Diagram Using Honeyd ................................................................. 15 Figure 3.1 The PLC Honeynet from the Adversary’s Viewpoint ............................... 19 Figure 3.2 Results of an nmap Scan on the PLC Honeynet ......................................... 19 Figure 3.3 Homepage for the Simulated Modicon PLC ............................................... 20 Figure 3.4 The PLC Honeynet from the Administrator’s Viewpoint ........................ 21 Figure 3.5 VMWare Infrastructure Web Interface ....................................................... 25 Figure 4.1 Snort Alert Count – SCADA Honeynet ......................................................... 32 Figure 4.2 Snort Alert Count – IT Network ................................................................... 28          
vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the many people who have helped me with 
this project as well as throughout the pursuit of my degree. First, I would like to thank my 
committee members Dr Doug Jacobson, Dr Thomas Daniels and Dr Diane Rover for their 
willingness to serve on my committee and for their feedback. I would especially like to thank 
Dr Jacobson for his guidance throughout this process. From the first day I arrived at Iowa 
State University, when he took time out of his hectic schedule to walk me through a last 
minute registration, he has always been available to answer questions and give advice. 
During the process of writing this thesis he provided direction and clarity at several critical 
points that proved invaluable. 
I would also like to thank my husband Daniel for his daily encouragement and support, 
his willingness to uproot and move cross country at a moment’s notice in pursuit of my 
dreams, for pulling all nighters with me just to keep me company, for celebrating the 
victories - big and small, and for making sure I ate more than toast every day.   
Finally, I am especially appreciative to the National Science Foundation for funding my 
education for the last two years. It is because of their assistance that I can now look forward 
to joining the ranks of those dedicated to securing our nation’s critical infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Since the Stuxnet worm was discovered by a Belarusian security company, there 
has been a growing awareness of and a renewed interest in control system security. There 
is concern from some security researchers that the attention Stuxnet has received will have 
a proliferating effect. Will control systems now attract more attention from hackers, 
organized crime, terrorists, and foreign intelligence services? Will these attacks evolve 
beyond the typical virus or malware driven attacks commonly seen?   
Using a honeynet designed for control systems, insight into these questions will be 
sought by comparing the number and types of attacks received by a simulated control 
system with the number and types of attacks received by an IT network. Also, the 
usefulness of using honeynets on control systems to track adversary’s means and methods 
as well as serve as an early warning system will be explored. 
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CHAPTER 1.  Introduction 
 
On June 10, 1999 a gasoline pipeline in Bellingham, WA ruptured, sending over 
200,000 gallons of gasoline flooding into Whatcom Creek.  An hour after the rupture, local 
residents and businesses began calling 911 to report a strong odor of gasoline. At about 
that time, 18-year old Liam Wood, who had been fishing in the creek, was overcome by 
fumes, fell into the water and drowned. To the north, two 10-year old boys, Wade King and 
Stephen Tsiorvas, were playing with a butane fireplace lighter. They inadvertently ignited the 
gasoline which exploded into a fireball sending smoke and ash almost six miles into the air 
[1].  Although the boys were found immediately and flown to an intensive-care burn unit, 
both sustained such serious burns that neither survived. 
  As tragic as that day was, it could have been much worse. Whatcom Creek flows 
through downtown Bellingham and empties into Bellingham Bay. Gasoline had migrated into 
the city’s sewer system and remained at explosive levels for an hour. If the gasoline had not 
ignited when and where it did, the loss of life and destruction to the city and port of 
Bellingham could have been much worse. [2]. 
Three years later the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released their 
findings. Their report stated that one of the contributing factors to the tragedy was the 
[pipeline] “company’s practice of performing database development work on the supervisory 
control and data acquisition [SCADA] system while the system was being used to operate 
the pipeline, which led to the system becoming non-responsive at a critical time during 
pipeline operations” [3]. As a result of this finding, the Bellingham pipeline rupture has 
become known as the first control system computer incident to result in the loss of human 
life [4]  
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There has never been any indication that the events of June 10 were anything other 
than a tragic accident. However, it serves as a warning of what could happen if someone 
with a grudge were to purposely tamper with the system controlling pipelines or another 
piece of critical infrastructure.  
The most frequently cited control system incident involving a malicious actor 
occurred in Queensland, Australia in the Shire of Maroochy. In 2000, Vitek Boden, who had 
been turned down for a municipal job, hacked into the city’s wastewater management 
system. Over the course of two months, Boden repeatedly drove around the Maroochy Shire 
Council area issuing radio commands to sewage equipment and causing over 230,000 
gallons of raw sewage to spill into local parks, rivers, and even onto the grounds of a Hyatt 
Regency hotel. One reason this incident is referenced so frequently is that it shows how 
difficult it can be to catch hackers. It wasn’t until Boden tampered with the SCADA system 
over 40 times that he fell under suspicion, was placed under surveillance and finally caught 
[5].  Another reason for the frequent re-telling is that this incident illustrates how tampering 
with a control system can have an impact on the real world.  
Most recently, the computer worm known as Stuxnet, alarmed security experts by its 
stealth and effectiveness in modifying the behavior of a specific industrial control system. 
Stuxnet is noteworthy for its size (larger than most malware at almost half a megabyte), 
sophistication, use of zero-day attacks, and stolen certificates. Also of interest is evidence 
that Stuxnet’s author(s) possessed insider (unpublished) knowledge of the targeted system 
[6]. Traditionally, control system operators have relied on the proprietary nature of control 
system protocols and devices to prevent attacks. Stuxnet demonstrates that this over- 
reliance on “security through obscurity” can leave the control system open to attack from a 
motivated attacker.  
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Since Stuxnet was discovered by a Belarusian security company, there has been a 
growing awareness of and a renewed interest in control system security. There is concern 
from some security researchers that the attention Stuxnet has received will have a 
proliferating effect. Will control systems now attract more attention from hackers, organized 
crime, terrorists, and foreign intelligence services? Will these attacks evolve beyond the 
typical virus or malware driven attacks commonly seen?   
This thesis will aim to answer these questions by simulating a type of control system 
with virtualized honeynet technology and comparing the type of traffic it receives with the 
traffic a typical IT computer receives in the same IP range. This thesis will also explore the 
usefulness of using honeypots to track attacks and serve as an early warning system for 
control system networks.       
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background 
information regarding the origins and development of SCADA systems, honeypots and 
honeynets, and related work using honeypot technology to track attacks on SCADA 
networks.  Chapter 3 presents the design and implementation of the project. Chapter 4 
discusses testing and results and Chapter 5 looks at future work and Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions of this project. 
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CHAPTER 2. Background 
 
This chapter broadly reviews SCADA systems and honeypots and honeynets. 
Section 2.1 begins with an overview of SCADA system origins and architecture. Section 2.2 
discusses the gradual convergence of SCADA networks with IT networks. Section 2.3 
explores the implications of that convergence. Section 2.4 provides a review of honeypots 
and honeynets and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter with a look at previous work done to 
apply the honeynet concept to a SCADA network.   
2.1 SCADA System Origins and Architecture 
SCADA systems are used to monitor and remotely control critical industrial 
processes while providing human operators with continuous, real-time information about the 
current state of those processes [7].  Initially, SCADA systems were confined to a particular 
plant but as technology advanced, SCADA systems began to be used to monitor and control 
geographically dispersed processes. These processes typically include those found in 
critical infrastructure components such as oil and gas pipelines, the power grid, and water 
distribution and delivery systems.   
SCADA systems originated in the 1960s with the mainframe computer technology 
available at the time.  The typical SCADA system is composed of four parts: a central 
computer (host), a number of field-based remote measurement and control units known as 
Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), a wide-area telecommunications system to connect them, 
and an operator interface to allow the operator to access the system. The operator interface 
is also referred to as the operator console, the Man Machine Interface (MMI), or the more 
politically correct Human Machine Interface (HMI) [7].   
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In the late 1970s, Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) began joining RTUs in 
performing the majority of on-site control.  PLCs originated in the automotive industry where 
they were created as a replacement for relay logic which was hard-wired, required a lot of 
space, and not easily changed.  Initially, PLCs were very large and expensive with minimal 
communication functionality.  Eventually communication ports were added so they could talk 
to each other and to computer-based operator interfaces. Today PLCs are commonly used 
as RTUs particularly in water/wastewater processing and treatment plants [7]. Although they 
were initially targeted for on-site automation, they were modified over time to allow remote 
downloading of logic and configuration changes which enabled them to be used in widely 
dispersed geographical locations [7].  
The diagram in Figure 2.1 shows the architecture of a typical SCADA system.  
Although there have been many advances in computer and communication technologies 
since the 1960s, modern SCADA systems still have a similar architecture. 
 
Figure 2.1 Typical SCADA System Architecture [9]
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2.2 SCADA Systems and IT Convergence 
      When SCADA systems were designed in the 1960s, the emphasis was on building 
robustness, reliability, flexibility, and safety into the system. This aim was achieved as many 
SCADA systems have been running for 10 or 20 years on radio and serial network 
connections [10]. Because they were designed originally to use proprietary protocols and 
operate in closed networks, security was not a priority and of course, there was no thought 
of connecting the systems to the Internet [11] [12]. Over time however, companies realized 
they could monitor output, material consumption and inventories more easily by capturing 
the data and sending it outside the SCADA system to the financial system, for example [12]. 
By sharing real-time generation, transmission and distribution data with regional load-
balancing entities, resources could be more intelligently delivered, resulting in cost savings 
[11]. Additionally, converting to Internet Protocol (IP) simplifies much of the networking 
involved in a SCADA system. Serial networks have relatively low bandwidth and 
complicated networking due to the variety of networks being used. These various types of 
networks require a front end processor that converts packets from a SCADA server into the 
right protocol. All this can be replaced in IP with a router which is much simpler [10].  
  With the performance boost and the cost savings that IP networks offer, it is not 
surprising that most SCADA networks today have migrated to the same operating systems 
and TCP/IP protocols used in corporate IT networks. Architecturally, SCADA systems are 
identical to any other system with the exception of the specialized application programs that 
make it a SCADA system and the need for 100% availability [7]. 
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2.3 Security Implications for SCADA System/IT Convergence 
 If SCADA system convergence with IT improved the security of SCADA systems, 
there would be less cause for concern. However, computer networks based on Ethernet and 
TCP/IP have had a long history of security vulnerabilities. The potential for introduction of 
these security vulnerabilities to networks responsible for the uninterrupted operation of 
services considered essential for our way of life should be carefully evaluated.   
2.3.1 Security Challenges Facing Modern SCADA Systems 
 One challenge that SCADA systems face is that vulnerability countermeasures 
routinely used in IT networks often cannot be deployed in automation systems. IT networks 
commonly employ antivirus software and encryption. Administrators perform penetration 
testing and routine information security audits. Software updates and patches are regularly 
implemented. Equipment is upgraded or replaced every three to five years and employees 
are trained in information security awareness.  Few or none of these countermeasures are 
commonly taken in SCADA networks. Anti-virus software is difficult to employ because 
delays in SCADA networks cannot be tolerated and excess computing capabilities at the 
local controller might not be available. Encryption has a negative impact on network 
performance and latency. Software updates and patching are infrequent because they 
require careful planning and usually the cooperation of component vendors. Penetration 
testing rarely occurs because of its potential to disrupt the control system. Security audits 
and security training for employees is rare, partially due to a lack of awareness of security 
issues on the part of management.  Equipment can stay in place for decades running 
operating systems and applications with known vulnerabilities [13].    
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 Two examples illustrate the difficulties in maintaining a SCADA control system that 
has implemented the same operating systems and protocols of an IT network.  The first 
example illustrates how a lack of security awareness can negatively impact SCADA 
operations. The second example illustrates how software updates, a common event in the IT 
world, can impact a SCADA system.  
 In January 2003, the Ohio Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant was hit by the Slammer 
worm. The scanning activity of the worm caused the plant’s computerized Safety Parameter 
Display System (SPDS) to crash. The SPDS is critical because it monitors crucial indicators 
such as core temperatures and radiation sensors. These and other indicators must be 
monitored at all times, even when the plant is offline. The SPDS was offline for almost five 
hours before being restored. An investigation after the event revealed that although the 
plant’s firewall was configured to block the port that the Slammer worm exploited, the worm 
was able to enter the Davis-Besse corporate network via a T1 line bridging it to the 
unsecured site of a Davis-Besse contractor.  In spite of this rogue connection, an infection 
could have been prevented if the Slammer patch had been installed. It had been published 
six months earlier but plant computer engineers were not aware that the patch existed [14].   
 Five years later in March 2008, an engineer at the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant in 
Georgia, installed a software update on a computer that monitored chemical and diagnostic 
data from the primary control systems.  The update caused the computer to reboot, which 
reset the data on the control system. The plant’s safety system interpreted the lack of data 
as a drop in the water reservoirs that cool the plant’s radioactive nuclear fuel rods. As a 
result, automated safety systems triggered a shutdown of the plant which lasted for two 
days. Although there was never any danger to the public, the shutdown was expensive, 
requiring power to be purchased from another part of the grid at a cost of about $1 million 
per day [15].   
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 Although Slammer didn’t specifically target the Davis-Besse plant and neither event 
posed a danger to the public, targeted attacks on SCADA systems have been of particular 
concern since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  SCADA systems are ubiquitous and affect 
everything from water control valves to oil and gas industry pipelines to street lights. There 
are portions of SCADA systems in almost every critical infrastructure [9]. Utility companies 
use them to manage electric grids, distribute natural gas and manage sewer and water 
systems. Manufacturers use them to manage factory floor equipment. Nuclear power plants 
use them to manage fission and power generation [11].  
2.3.2 Risk and Response 
      The ability to successfully attack a physical piece of equipment over the Internet 
has already been demonstrated. Researchers at Idaho National Laboratory conducted The 
Aurora Generator Test in 2007 during which they were able to issue rogue instructions to a 
27-ton power generator and cause it to self-destruct. The impact of an event such as this 
would include the cost of replacing the expensive generator and the corresponding loss of 
power until it could be replaced. Since that type of generator is no longer made in the United 
States, it could take three to four months to replace, during which time homes and 
businesses in that area could be without power [16].    
 Although attacks (intentional and unintentional) against critical infrastructure have 
been successful, SCADA system operators tend to dismiss security concerns as irrelevant 
or exaggerated. The two most common reasons for this lack of concern is a belief in the 
notion that SCADA systems are secure because they’re not connected to the Internet and 
because they use little-known protocols and device. 
 The idea that control systems are not connected to the Internet overlooks the fact 
that the Internet is just one remote entry point to a SCADA system. According to research 
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conducted by the British Columbia Institute of Technology , a group that monitors SCADA 
system attacks, the Internet is the entry point for just 13% of attacks on SCADA systems. 
Other points of entry include business networks, corporate Wide Area Networks (WAN) and 
wireless systems. Figure 2.2 shows additional points of remote entry that cannot be 
overlooked [17].   
 
Figure 2.2 Remote Points of Entry into SCADA Systems 
 
 
 
 
 
The Slammer worm that affected the Davis-Besse power plant had three different infiltration 
paths in addition to the contractor’s T1 line; a VPN, an employee’s home computer and a 
dial-up modem. At least three of the four different paths had firewalls installed [18].  
   Security through obscurity is another firmly held belief. For many years SCADA 
systems were proprietary and isolated. Even though they are becoming increasingly less 
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proprietary and less isolated, a typical industry view continues to be that “Most public utilities 
rely on a highly customized SCADA system. No two are the same, so hacking them requires 
specific knowledge” [19]. In reality, control system protocols are becoming increasingly open 
and the recently launched Sentinel Hyper-Optimized Data Access Network (SHODAN) 
search engine makes it easy for hackers to find Internet facing SCADA systems anywhere in 
the world. Another blow to security through obscurity came in March 2011, when 35 SCADA 
vulnerabilities were published, most with proof of concept (PoC) code. This is not 
insignificant since the vulnerabilities affect approximately a million installed systems around 
the world [20]. Almost simultaneously, the Russian owned company, GLEG Ltd, announced 
that it is selling a SCADA exploit pack containing almost two dozen modules and nine 0-day 
exploits for attacking systems by various manufacturers. 
 Given the security challenges that SCADA systems face, tools that can enhance 
security or shed light on how a control system can be made more secure are of interest. 
One such tool is honeypot and honeynet technology.  
2.4 Honeypots & Honeynets 
      In 1986, a 75-cent discrepancy in billing for computer time piqued the curiosity of 
Clifford Stoll, an astrophysicist working as a system administrator at Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory. By carefully reviewing log files and recording network activity, Stoll was 
able to determine that a hacker was accessing the computer system and actively searching 
for files containing confidential information. In an effort to maintain the attacker’s interest and 
buy time to track his movements, Stoll created false but official looking military documents 
for the intruder to find. After months of watching, Stoll, along with the FBI, was finally able to 
identify the intruder as a German citizen who had been searching for sensitive military 
information to sell to a foreign interest [21].  
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      A few years later, Bill Cheswick recounted his experience tracking a hacker in his 
paper, An Evening with Berferd [22]. In addition to logging the intruder’s activity, Cheswick 
emulated an operating system by hand as well as various services to engage the intruder. It 
was the first example of a honeypot, a computer whose value lies in attracting adversaries 
so that their methods and tools can be examined by researchers. 
      Honeypots became well-known with the emergence of the Honeynet Project in 1999. 
Founded by Lance Spitzner, the goal of the Honeynet Project was to improve the security of 
the Internet in three ways: by increasing awareness of Internet threats and vulnerabilities, by 
providing details about how to secure and defend resources, and by providing tools and 
techniques to further security research [23]. Since 1999, Honeynet Project chapters around 
the world have operated honeynets to research various Internet threats and share 
information.  
      Honeypots come in two flavors, high-interaction and low-interaction. In a high-
interaction honeypot nothing is emulated. A real operating system and applications are 
used.  (The term ‘honeynet’ is used to describe a high-interaction honeypot that provides 
entire networks of systems for attackers to interact with [23]. In contrast to high-interaction 
honeypots, low-interaction honeypots emulate only services that cannot be exploited to gain 
complete access to the honeypot. They are easier to deploy and maintain than high-
interaction honeypots. They’re also less risky since the attacker never has access to the 
operating system. The tradeoff is that they’re easier for an attacker to detect.  The following 
table summarizes the differences between the two types of honeypots [23]. 
 
Table 2.1   Honeypot Types [23] 
Low-interaction 
Solution emulates operating systems and 
services 
High-interaction 
No emulation, real operating systems and 
services are provided 
• Easy to install and deploy. Usually • Can capture far more information 
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Low-interaction 
Solution emulates operating systems and 
services 
High-interaction 
No emulation, real operating systems and 
services are provided 
requires simply installing and configuring 
software on a computer. 
• Minimal risk, as the emulated services 
control what attackers can and cannot 
do. 
• Captures limited amounts of information 
mainly transactional data and some 
limited interaction 
including new tools, communications, or 
attacker keystrokes. 
• Can be complex to install or deploy 
(commercial versions tend to be much 
simpler). 
• Increased risk, as attackers are provided 
real operating systems to interact with 
 
 
      Over the years honeypots and honeynets have become more sophisticated. The 
current generation (Gen III) of honeynet technology offers improved data control, data 
capture, detection prevention, and ease of deployment. The Honeywall bootable CDROM 
developed by the Honeynet Project contains all of the tools and functionality needed to 
easily create, maintain, and analyze a Gen III honeynet. Since the arrival of virtualization, 
the cost of implementing a network of honeypots or a honeynet is greatly reduced. Now 
dozens of virtual honeypots can be created on a single network using a small daemon called 
Honeyd.  
 Honeyd was developed by Niels Provos and has many features including the ability 
to simulate as many IP addresses as can be configured via a configuration file and the 
ability to deceive Nmap and Xprobe by changing output packets to match the fingerprint 
corresponding to the operating system defined in the configuration file [24].  
 A sample Honeyd configuration file can be seen below in Figure 2.3. In this 
configuration file, a generic Windows machine is created before its personality is defined 
more specifically as a Windows NT 4.0 Server.  Ports 80, 135, 137 and 139 are opened 
while all other ports are closed by default with the ‘reset’ command. Finally, the template is 
assigned to a list of IP addresses with the ‘bind’ command. The bind command is a 
convenient way to bind as many IP addresses as desired the the window template. 
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Figure 2.3  Sample Honeyd configuration file [25] 
 
############################################################## 
###  IP addresses are assigned to virtual hosts that we ### 
### want to simulate within Honeyd with the bind  ### 
### configuration.  Here, we bind the honeypot IPs  ### 
### to a template called windows that we have defined. ### 
############################################################## 
  
### Windows NT4 web server 
create windows 
set windows personality “Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6” 
Add windows tcp port 80 “perl scripts/iis-0.95/iisemul8.pl” 
add windows tcp 139 open 
add windows tcp port 137 open 
add windows udp port 137 open 
add windows udp port 135 open 
set windows default tcp action reset 
set windows default udp action reset 
  
Bind 10.0.1.51 windows 
Bind 10.0.1.52 windows 
Bind 10.1.0.51 windows 
Bind 10.1.0.52 windows 
Bind 10.1.1.51 windows 
Bind 10.1.1.52 windows 
Bind 10.2.0.51 windows 
Bind 10.2.0.52 windows 
Bind 10.2.1.51 windows 
Bind 10.2.1.52 windows 
   
 Similar configuration files for many other operating systems can be included to 
create as many virtual honeypots as desired. Figure 2.4 shows how a network using Honeyd 
might appear. 
  
15 
  Figure 2.4  Network diagram using Honeyd [24]  
 
 
      Honeypots and honeynets have value in production environments as well as 
research environments. In production environments honeypots excel at detection, yielding 
information that is not available from network intrusion detection systems. Keystrokes can 
be logged even when encryption is used and vulnerabilities with unknown signatures can be 
detected. Since they have no production value, any activity on a honeypot is likely to be 
unauthorized or malicious, significantly minimizing the number of false positives typically 
reported by intrusion detection systems. If compromised, they can be quickly and easily 
taken offline for forensic analysis without affecting day-to-day operations.  The information 
they collect can provide organizations with the kind of in-depth information they need to 
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respond rapidly to an incident.  Finally, honeypots can serve as decoys to deter adversaries 
from attacking the real systems. 
      In research environments, honeypots collect information on threats. This information 
is then used to identify attackers and their tools and methods, understand their motivations, 
and gain insight into their community. It is also useful for analyzing trends, acting as an early 
warning system or making predictions about future attacks and trends [23]. 
2.5 SCADA Networks & Honeypots – Related Work 
       While honeypots and honeynets have been deployed on the Internet and in 
enterprise networks for over a decade, their use with control systems has been much more 
limited.  Research into honeynets applied to SCADA networks revealed two efforts to build a 
PLC Honeynet. Recall from Figure 2.1 that the PLC has become a popular replacement for 
the RTU (Remote Terminal Unit), a device that sends and receives data between control 
networks and field networks. 
 Section 2.5.1 reviews The PLC Honeynet Project by Cisco’s Critical Infrastructure 
Assurance Group and Section 2.5.2 describes the PLC Honeynet developed by Digital 
Bond, a control system security company. 
2.5.1 PLC Honeynet Project  
      The first PLC Honeynet was developed by Matthew Franz and Venkat Pothamsetty 
of the Cisco Critical Infrastructure Assurance Group (CIAG). Released in March of 2004, it 
uses Honeyd to simulate the following services from a popular PLC: 
• TCP/IP Stack of the PLC 
• Modbus/TCP server implementation 
• FTP server found on some PLCs 
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• Telnetd server found on some PLCs 
• HTTP server (increasingly common on PLCs and other industrial network 
devices) 
     Franz and Pothamsetty’s goal was to determine the feasibility of building a software 
framework to simulate a variety of industrial networks and industrial devices and to 
determine if the software framework could be deployed from a single Linux host. A 
secondary goal was to collect information about general attack patterns and specific exploits 
that could be used to write signatures for IDS products should the deployment of the PLC 
Honeynet become broad enough. They also noted the lack of available information about 
SCADA vulnerabilities and attacks and the need to develop a public repository of vendor 
advisories and vulnerabilities in industrial devices as a motivating reason for their work. [26]. 
      Franz and Pothamsetty’s work is not maintained but is still available online at 
www.sourceforge.net.  
2.5.2 Digital Bond 
      In 2006, Digital Bond, built a virtual PLC Honeynet consisting of two virtual machines 
(VMs). The first VM serves as the target and simulates a Modicon PLC along with a number 
of services. The second VM is used to monitor all network activity and statistics by using the 
Honeywall (Section 2.4) to detect and track any malicious attacks that occur against the 
target VM. In order to monitor the PLC, Digital Bond created a collection of fourteen Snort 
Identifiers specifically designed to detect PLC attacks and added them to the Honeywall VM.  
Digital Bond has made their two VMs available for download [27] to anyone wishing 
to install a PLC Honeynet on their own. They have also developed a PLC Honeynet that 
uses a physical PLC instead of a software simulation.  
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CHAPTER 3. Design & Implementation 
 
 This chapter discusses the design and implementation of the test system used for 
this thesis. Section 3.1 explains the overall architecture of the design from the attacker’s and 
administrator’s point of view. Section 3.2 provides implementation details including issues 
encountered during the implementation process. 
3.1 Design 
 Rather than duplicate earlier efforts, this thesis makes use of the Digital Bond PLC 
Honeynet framework as described in Chapter 2, section 2.5.2. At the time this thesis was 
undertaken, Digital Bond permitted registered subscribers to download honeynet images 
from their site for a $100 annual fee. This fee has recently been eliminated and all images 
used for this thesis are now available free of charge.  
3.1.1 The Honeynet from the Outside In 
 3.1.1.1  From the Adversary’s Perspective 
 As far as the adversary is concerned, the Target VM is simply another Internet 
facing, machine. From his perspective, the machine located at 129.186.215.1 appears as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 The PLC Honeynet from the Adversary’s Viewpoint 
 
 If an attacker were to perform an nmap (network map) scan, the following open ports 
and services would be displayed.  
 
Figure 3.2 Results of an nmap scan on the PLC Honeynet 
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 Likewise, by typing http://bld-control.iac.iastate.edu into a browse, the homepage for 
Schneider Electric, manufacturer of the Modicon Modbus/TCP can be accessed. 
 
Figure 3.3 Homepage for the Simulated Modicon PLC 
 
 
 3.1.1.2 From the Administrator’s Perspective 
 In actuality, the adversary only reaches 129.186.215.1 after passing through a 
second network interface card (NIC) on the physical machine hosting both the Honeywall 
and the Target VMs. The Honeywall VM, operating in bridge mode, bridges the adversary to 
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the target VM, logging all activity as it does so. The Honeynet from the administrator’s 
viewpoint is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 The PLC Honeynet from the Administrator’s Viewpoint 
 
 The administrator is able to manage the honeynet locally or remotely via the NIC 
configured with the IP address 129.186.215.1. 
 3.1.2  The Target VM  
 The Honeypot services offered by the Target VM include HTTP, FTP, Telnet, SNMP, 
VxWorks Debugger and Modbus/TCP. Of these, perhaps VxWorks Debugger and 
Modbus/TCP are the least familiar. Modbus is an application layer protocol commonly used 
in control systems. It was published originally in 1979 by Modicon and is one of the most 
widely used control systems protocol. It is used in many different industries to monitor and 
control processes. VxWorks is a proprietary, real-time operating system designed for 
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embedded systems. It runs on top of another host operating system such as Unix, Linux or 
Windows and is used in many aerospace and defense products including the Mars 
Reconnaissance Rover and satellites [28].  
 VxWorks Debugger is one of the elements included in the VxWorks Workbench and 
allows developers to make and test real time changes to the operating system. Since 
Modbus and VxWorks Debugger are not typically seen in IT networks, we will be especially 
interested in vulnerabilities associated with them.  
 The remaining services (HTTP, FTP, SNMP, and Telnet) are partially implemented to 
give the impression of a real system without allowing an attacker too many opportunities to 
successfully attack the virtual machine. For example, Telnet will return banners that 
resemble a PLC but will not actually allow any logins. FTP will appear functional but no 
password will ever allow entry. Any attempt to log into the Target using the FTP port will be 
met with the following response: 
[root@kosh]# ftp 129.186.215.1 
Connected to 129.186.215.1. 
220 VxWorks FTP servers (VxWorks 5.3.1) ready. 
534 Only TLS is supported. 
534 Only TLS is supported. 
KERBEROS_V4 rejected as an authentication type 
Name (129.186.215.1:root): root 
331 Need password for user root 
Password: 
431 Username and password do not match 
Login failed. 
ftp>  
 Although the attempt to login will fail, additional (potentially useful for the attacker) 
information is displayed. An attacker would see immediately that VxWorks Debugger 
appears to be installed on this machine. With any SCADA awareness at all, the attacker will 
know that the VxWorks Debugger listens on UDP Port 17185. Additionally, the intruder 
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might recall that a vulnerability in the VxWorks Debugger was published in August 2010. 
This information could serve as powerful motivation to explore further. 
3.1.3  The Honeywall VM 
 The Honeywall VM provides a web-based management interface called Walleye 
(‘eye on the wall’). Using this interface, the Honeywall manager can quickly and easily 
configure data capture options as well as set data collection and reporting/alerting 
preferences. Snort is used for intrusion detection. Wireshark provides packet capture 
capabilities. Sebekd enables keystroke logging even in encrypted environments. Argus 
collects network statistics and MySQL is used for data storage. There are many 
configuration options available providing a high degree of flexibility to the Honeynet 
administrator. 
3.2 Implementation 
 Ideally, a PLC Honeynet would be incorporated into a piece of existing critical 
infrastructure where it could blend in and perhaps see some activity from SCADA aware 
attackers. As this was the envisioned arrangement at the outset of this thesis, the Iowa 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management Department was contacted with a request 
to place the honeynet device on one or more critical infrastructures for research purposes. 
Although the request was considered, it was ultimately declined due to the “challenges 
posed to organizational structure, staff resources and security”. In spite of this setback, a 
decision was made to proceed by placing the PLC Honeynet within the Iowa State 
University network. While this arrangement was not ideal, it was hoped that valuable data 
regarding SCADA system attacks and/or patterns could still be acquired.  To this end, two IP 
addresses were provisioned. The first IP address (129.186.215.214/kosh.issl.iastate.edu) 
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was assigned to the physical host while the second IP address (129.185.215.1/bld-
control.iastate.edu) was assigned to the Target VM. The name ‘bld-control’ was chosen to 
imply the presence of some kind of control system. 
 Before the VM images could be loaded, it was necessary to assemble a computer. 
The computer that was built met or exceeded the minimum recommended specifications 
provided by Digital Bond. The following table lists Digital Bond’s recommendations along 
with the actual specifications of the computer that was custom built for this implementation. 
 
Table 3.1 Recommended and Actual Specifications 
 Recommendation Actual 
Processor 1 GHz 2 GHz 
Memory 512 MB 4 GB 
Network Interface 
Cards (NICs) 
2 2 
Operating System Ubuntu version 6.06 LTS 
(Dapper Drake) 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux – 
Server version 5.5 
VMware  VMware Server version 1.0  VMware Server version 2.02 
 
 Following computer assembly, Red Hat Enterprise Linux was installed onto the 
computer. The computer was then configured for Internet access so that VMware Server 
could be downloaded from www.vmware.com. Once VMware Server was installed, the 
Target VM and Honeywall VM images were downloaded and two VMs were created using 
those images. The two VMs can be further configured as needed using the VMWare Server 
Interface that is Web Accessible. The Interface can be seen below in Figure 3.5 
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Figure 3.5 VMware Infrastructure Web Interface 
 
 
 
 In the Inventory column along the left side, the Honeywall VM known as ‘roo’ (a 
follow-up on the first generation Honeywall, ‘eyeore’) and the Target VM are listed. The VMs 
can be controlled with the power/pause/reset buttons at the top of the screen or from the 
Commands section on the right hand side of the screen. The performance characteristics of 
the selected VM (roo, in the figure) are shown at the top of the Summary tab with the 
Hardware characteristics stated below. The status of the VM in the upper right corner yields 
additional information about the VM selected in the Inventory window. 
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3.3 Implementation Issues 
 
 In the course of implementing the PLC Honeynet, several issues were encountered. 
Most of the issues were related to the age of the original PLC Honeynet implementation and 
the brevity of the available documentation.  
 As previously discussed, the PLC Honeynet was created in 2006. In the intervening 
years there have been several updates to operating system software. For example, in 2006, 
Digital Bond recommended Ubuntu 6.06 as the best operating system for the host computer 
since it worked so “nicely” with VMWare Server. Unfortunately, the current version of Ubuntu 
did not work well at all with the current version of VMWare Server. Eventually the decision 
was made to switch to Ret Hat Enterprise Linux Server.   
 More serious however, was the belated discovery that after being fully implemented, 
the PLC Honeynet was acting as a rogue Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
Server. Several days passed during which Internet access for the building was negatively 
impacted before the source of the problem was traced to the PLC Honeynet. As with all 
virtual networks, a DHCP server had been provided in the PLC Honeynet. These DHCP 
servers normally do not interfere with other DHCP servers. However, because of the way 
the Honeywall VM was configured to deliver traffic straight to the Target VM, it was picking 
up the broadcasted DHCP requests off the network and passing them directly to the Target 
VM. The Target VM then sent a response to the Honeywall VM which passed it out onto the 
network. Since these responses weren’t legitimate, users experienced slower access 
speeds or no access at all due to the incorrect IP network or gateway addresses. 
 As a result of the issues faced, this thesis will include an updated set of installation 
instructions in the Appendix.   
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CHAPTER 4. Testing 
 
 This chapter describes the process of testing the PLC Honeynet implementation. It 
begins with a description of the data collection process in Section 4.1 followed by an 
explanation of testing goals in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides a brief overview of  
vulnerabilities associated with PLCs, VxWorks Debugger, and SNMP. Finally section 4.4 
concludes the chapter with observations and analysis of the data collected during the testing 
process.  
4.1 Data Collection Process 
 The PLC Honeynet was in operation for thirty eight days during which thirty one days 
of data was collected. No data was captured for seven non-consecutive days during this 
period due to various data capture malfunctions and virtual machine configuration issues. 
The bulk of the data collected was in the form of packet captures and reports generated 
from Snort intrusion detection activities. Packet captures were taken every hour to provide a 
snapshot of network activity. Snort logging activity was stored automatically in log files and 
used in conjunction with the daily packet captures to generate daily summaries. Snort 
reported on various metrics including the top ten scanned ports, the top ten remote IPs, the 
number of packets in and out of the network, and the total number of Snort identifiers (IDs) 
generated. The Snort IDs logged can be divided into two basic categories: those typically 
associated with general IT-style attacks and those specifically related to SCADA system 
intrusions. The following excerpt from a Snort summary report shows both types of Snort 
IDs. Note the final entry with SID 1111009. This ID is one of the fourteen SCADA specific 
28 
IDs written by Digital Bond. These Snort IDs can be added to the Snort IDs typically loaded 
into a database to detect the signatures of known intrusions into a network.  
 
All Snort Alerts 
================ 
SID    Alert Description 
--------------------------------- 
17  (portscan) UDP Portscan 
19       (portscan) UDP Portsweep 
55       (Snort_decoder): Truncated Tcp Options 
469       ICMP PING NMAP 
1384      MISC UPnP malformed advertisement 
2189      BAD-TRAFFIC IP Proto 103 PIM 
1111009      Modbus TCP - Non-Modbus Communication on TCP Port 502 
 
 The following table lists all fourteen of the Snort IDs associated with attacks on 
Modbus/TCP. These IDs will prove useful when it comes to the task of separating typical 
network attacks from attacks targeting control systems. A summary of the rules, their 
description, attack scenarios, and corrective actions are listed in the Appendix.  
 
Table 4.1 Modbus/TCP Snort Rules [29] 
1111001 Force Listen Only Mode 1111008 Illegal Packet Size, Possible DoS Attack 
1111002 Restart Communication Option 1111009 Non-Modbus Communication on TCP Port 
502 
1111003 Clear Counters and Diagnostic 
Registers 
1111010 Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay 
1111004 Read Device Identification 1111011 Acknowledge Exception Code Delay 
1111005 Report Slave ID 1111012 Incorrect Packet Length, Possible DOS 
Attack 
1111006 Unauthorized Read Request to a 
PLC 
1111013 Points List Scan 
1111007 Unauthorized Write Request to a 
PLC 
1111014 Function Code Scan 
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4.2 Testing Goals 
 The goal of testing and analysis for this thesis was twofold. First, within the PLC 
Honeynet implementation, we would like to distinguish between typical network attacks and 
attacks focusing on the PLC.  Second, we would like to compare all attacks on the PLC 
Honeynet with all attacks seen on another computer in the same IP address with no SCADA 
related services installed to determine if the PLC Honeynet attracted more or less attention. 
Before discussing potential attacks further, it is useful to look at what types of vulnerabilities 
are unique to PLCs, VxWorks Debugger and SNMP and therefore subject to exploitation. 
4.3 Vulnerabilities Specific to PLCs, VxWorks Debugger and SNMP 
 Before discussing attacks observed on the system it is helpful to briefly review a few 
security weaknesses seen in three of the services running on the simulated system. These 
three services are the Programmable Logic Circuit (PLC), the VxWorks Debugger, and the 
Simple Network Management Protocol. 
4.3.1 PLC 
 As discussed in Sections 2.1 and 3.1.1, Programmable Logic Circuits have rapidly 
gained in popularity. The PLC used in the network simulation is a Schneider Modicon 
Product running the Modbus/TCP protocol. Modbus is entirely free of security features. 
There is no concept of a ‘user name’ or ‘password’ to authenticate users or devices 
attempting to connect to a Modbus PLC. Although a few PLC vendors have attempted to 
add password systems onto Modbus, these are not sophisticated and are easily exploitable. 
In the security industry, it is well known that “if you can ping the PLC – you own it”. The 
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simulated PLC implemented here is representative of the typically vulnerable PLC running 
Modbus/TCP on the market today.  
4.3.2 VxWorks Debugger 
 In 2010, four years after Digital Bond created their PLC Honeynet, ICS-CERT 
(Industrial Control Systems – Cyber Emergency Response Team) released a vulnerability 
report for VxWorks Debugger [30].  Their report cited the lack of access control for the 
debugger which is of concern for two reasons. First, the remote debugger enables 
developers to read out and edit all of the device memory as well as call arbitrary functions. 
Second, some vendors failed to disable access to the debugger before releasing their final 
product. Although the VxWorks debugger service that appears to be listening on the PLC 
Honeynet is not vulnerable to such an attack since it accepts only connections to UDP port 
17185, there is still the opportunity to watch for any attempt to do more than connect to port 
17185. 
4.3.3 SNMP 
 Although SNMP isn’t unique to control systems, it is frequently used to control and 
configure the remote devices used in control systems. Of particular concern with regard to 
SNMPs utilization in control systems is the lack of security in early SNMP versions (v1 and 
v2c). These SNMP versions do not implement encryption and are thus subject to packet 
sniffing. Another issue is that SNMP works primarily over UDP which is connectionless and 
vulnerable to IP spoofing. A spoofed IP address can be used to bypass the access control 
list on a device after which an attacker can issue arbitrary commands.  
31 
 SNMP version three adds security mechanisms to the protocol that provide 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. However, as discussed previously, software 
updates in control system environments are typically infrequent so older versions of SNMP 
are still in use. Although the SNMP service simulated on the PLC Honeynet only responds 
to read commands, it will be of interest if the use of SNMP attracts attention as a result of its 
potential vulnerabilities. 
4.4 Observations and Analysis 
 Section 4.4.1 looks first at observed activity on the PLC Honeynet that is typically 
associated with general IT-style attacks.  Next, Section 4.4.2 looks at activity on the PLC 
Honeynet that appears to be SCADA related. Finally Section 4.4.3 compares all activity 
seen on the PLC Honeynet with all activity seen on a typical IT network in the same IP 
range.  
4.4.1 General and SCADA specific attacks – SCADA Honeynet 
 During the data collection period, 1,981,739 Snort alerts were generated on the PLC 
Honeynet. This was not unexpected. The Target VM is not a production computer and thus 
all traffic is considered suspicious. 
 Even though there were a large number of alerts, the type of alerts was relatively 
small.  The Appendix contains a table summarizing the alerts received and the potential 
impact of a successful attack. 
 What was unexpected was that the vast majority of alerts generated were due to a 
single type of attack, the UPnP Malformed Advertisement. Also unexpected was that so 
many alerts would be generated for an attack that only affects older Windows systems 
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(Windows 98, 98SE, ME, and XP).  As the platform for the PLC Honeynet is Linux, it 
suggests that the potential intruders were entirely incognizant of the nature of their target. 
 As Figure 4.1 shows, other types of alerts make up a small portion of the almost 2 
million alerts generated.  
Figure 4.1 Snort Alert Count – SCADA Honeynet 
 
 Due to the nature of the PLC Honeynet, the number of SCADA related attacks 
(attacks aimed at SCADA related services) is of particular interest. Assuming that a potential 
attacker begins the hacking process by scanning for open ports, he or she may notice that 
some unexpected ports are open. An attempt to ftp to the Target VM would reveal the 
presence of VxWorks Debugger as illustrated in Section 3.3.1.  Furthermore, simply typing 
the IP address in the URL field of a browser would bring up the Schneider Modicon home 
33 
page. There would be multiple opportunities for a potential attacker to recognize that this 
computer was atypical for a university setting and that it may have unique and exploitable 
vulnerabilities. 
 The alert data collected however, indicates no user interest in the nature of the 
Target VM. Beyond port scanning, no Snort alerts were generated during the thirty one days 
data collection period for VxWorks Debugger (udp 17185) or Modbus (tcp 502).  
4.4.2 Attacks – IT Network 
 On the surface, the alerts received on the IT network appear somewhat different than 
those received on the SCADA network (see Figure 4.2 below). Perhaps the most visible 
difference is the number of alerts generated by each network. The IT network received far 
fewer alerts overall - 3,540 compared to the almost two million received by the SCADA 
network. This however, is typical of honeynets that alert on every connection while typical IT 
networks can’t assume that every connection is an attack.  
 A second difference is that the IT network experienced a wider variety of attacks than 
the SCADA network. Although interesting, attack diversity can be explained by the fact that 
students learning how to compromise computers and networks routinely use the IT network 
for practice. It’s intuitive that students learning many different attack methods would be more 
likely to try a variety of attacks than someone who wasn’t moving methodically through a 
textbook on the subject. 
 Both networks experienced a spike in one particular attack. In the case of the 
SCADA network, the most common type of attack was the Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) 
malformed advertisement attack. The IT network’s most common type of attack was an 
Open Port Scan attack. Again, it’s likely that student’s would start an attack by scanning the 
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network and carefully gathering information instead of non-discriminately blasting a 
Windows attack at a Linux machine. 
 In general, the two types of networks received similar attacks. The differences in 
alerts received were not different enough to distinguish one network from the other. 
 
Figure 4.2 Snort Alert Count – IT Network 
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CHAPTER 5. Conclusion & Future Work 
 
 Recent events surrounding the Stuxnet worm attack and the subsequent release of 
multiple control system vulnerabilities have caused alarm in the control system security 
community. Many are concerned that the publicity Stuxnet has received and the advertising 
of control system vulnerabilities will lead to an increase in attacks on control systems. 
Others believe this is unlikely and point to the downward trend of attacks on control systems 
since the height of the Slammer attacks in 2003. 
 This thesis set out to determine if there is indeed increased interest in attacking 
control systems, and if so, what different types of attacks are being used in addition to the 
familiar viruses, worms and Trojan attacks? An additional question this thesis sought to 
answer was whether or not honeypots and honeynets were useful tools in protecting control 
system networks and if they held any value as early warning systems. 
 In order to answer these questions, a virtual SCADA honeynet was implemented 
using existing virtual machine images for a target PLC (the Target VM) and a 
monitoring/management system (the Honeywall VM). The Target VM simulated a Schneider 
Modicon PLC, one of the most popular PLCs on the market today. Several other services 
were also implemented including Telnet, FTP, SNMP, HTTP, Modbus/TCP, and VxWorks 
Debugger. As the final two services are PLC specific, they were of particular interest. An 
existing second network in the same IP range with typical IT network characteristics was 
selected for observation as well. The IT network also offered similar services as the SCADA 
Honeynet (with the exception of Modbus/TCP and VxWorks Debugger, of course). 
 Both networks were monitored for 31 days and data in the form of packet captures, 
Snort alerts and various log files were collected. Finally the data was analyzed in light of the 
questions posed previously. 
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 The results indicated that while the SCADA Honeynet system received plenty of 
attention, not a single “visitor” to the honeynet attempted to take advantage of the SCADA 
specific services in spite of their well-known vulnerabilities. Far from being SCADA aware, 
most attackers did not even seem to be operating system aware since the majority of 
attacks targeted vulnerable Windows operating systems. 
 The IT network experienced a respectable amount of attention as well. When 
comparing the types of attacks seen between the two networks, it was clear that the IT 
network experienced a wider variety of attacks than the SCADA Honeynet. It was difficult to 
compare the number of attacks since the SCADA Honeynet IDS logged every connection as 
suspicious while the IT Network IDS only logged what appeared to be an attack. 
 The reasons why the SCADA Honeynet did not receive SCADA specific attacks can 
only be speculated. Perhaps the SCADA Honeynet just wasn’t discovered by the “right” 
people. Perhaps those who found it didn’t realize what they were looking at. Or maybe they 
did and just didn’t care. Possibly they figured out it was a honeypot or decided that attacking 
it wasn’t worth the effort.  
 At least two conclusions can be drawn from this project. First, computers on IT 
networks receive typical IT network attacks.  This could be a result of attackers seeing only 
what they expect to see or because those looking to attack SCADA networks typically don’t 
start looking for them within university IP address ranges. Second, the more specific the 
honeypot, the less it seems to get noticed – at least for reasons the honeypot administrator 
would like for it to be noticed. These two problems have solutions but it is worth asking if the 
entire SCADA honeynet approach provides enough benefit to be worthwhile. Is it too much 
effort and risk for too little return? 
 Honeynets have shown themselves to be useful IT network tools for capturing 
unknown attacks and attack methods, acting as decoys to lure attackers away from valuable 
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business assets and as early warning systems for networks. But what about SCADA 
networks? Are these networks getting attacked enough to take on even a carefully managed 
risk such as a honeypot? Some security experts say the danger is overstated especially in 
light of critical infrastructure owners hardening their systems with firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, encryption and improved authentication methods. Besides, other than 
the Stuxnet worm, there hasn’t really been a serious security incident and with Stuxnet 
being so complicated and expensive to write, what are the chances of something like that 
happening again very soon?  
 Others say that it’s just a matter of time until there’s another serious attack. SCADA 
systems are on the radar now like never been before and it may not even take a 
complicated exploit to cause real damage. Attacks may be trending down but that may just 
be a result of improved security measures deflecting the low-level “noisy” attacks from less-
skilled adversaries. What could be sliding past the intrusion detection systems are the 
“quiet” targeted attacks from highly-skilled adversaries using attacks and methods that 
haven’t been seen before. 
 If low-level attacks are being deflected by security measures, then the attacks to be 
concerned about are the high-level, never seen before attacks. These kinds of attacks are 
exactly the type of activity that a honeypot/honeynet could monitor. A honeypot/honeynet 
could provide valuable information to security personnel regarding typical traffic patterns, log 
any unusual traffic and serve as the sacrificial system in the event of an attack. For these 
reasons, implementing a honeypot/honeynet on a control system would be worth the effort 
and the risk involved. 
 Once the decision has been made to implement a honeypot/honeynet, a control 
system owner most likely will not want to encourage attention from attackers. In a research 
environment however, the more traffic the better. The question then becomes one of how to 
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attract the right kind of attention. As Pothamsetty and Franz observed, an ideal deployment 
site would be a subnet close to a real SCADA network or a phone number belonging to a 
SCADA plant [26]. However, as was demonstrated with this project, it can be difficult to 
convince the SCADA network administrator of the benefits of a honeypot/honeynet. It may 
be possible over time to develop a working relationship with a critical infrastructure owner 
and together implement a low-interaction honeynet in incremental stages in such a way that 
all parties have confidence that the benefits outweigh the risks. If this isn’t possible, a less 
ideal deployment site could be used. The issue then becomes one of how to drive SCADA 
aware attackers to a honeynet in an atypical location.  One way to accomplish this is for the 
honeynet administrator to frequent online bulletin boards and chat rooms known to be 
hacker friendly and issue a hacking challenge.  Perhaps a monetary prize could be offered 
for the first person to successfully compromise the SCADA honeynet. 
 Overall, this project proved to be a good first step in implementing a SCADA 
Honeynet. Setting up a Honeynet is not a trivial task. It takes time to learn how to manage 
and monitor the honeynet. Each day the data collected by the honeynet must be reviewed 
and analyzed. These are issues that a control system administrator would need to take into 
consideration before undertaking such a venture.  
 In an effort to ease the burden on administrators, future work could include creating a 
virtual appliance honeynet that is fully configured and secured. Such a virtual appliance 
could be packaged with automated data logging and analysis that could be read and acted 
on by a security person without the need for the expense and time that high level security 
training requires. If such an appliance were readily available and showed proven results, 
SCADA Honeynets could gain in popularity and begin to provide the kind of intelligence that 
helps keep our critical infrastructure secure. 
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APPENDIX 
SNORT ALERTS – SCADA HONEYNET 
 
Alert Impact 
TCP Portscans & Portsweeps Normally indicative of network reconnaissance and potential future targeted attack. 
UDP Portscans & Portsweeps Normally indicative of network reconnaissance and potential future targeted attack. 
HTTP Inspect Directory traversal outside the root directory of a web server 
Web Root Directory Traversal Directory traversal outside the root directory of a web server 
Truncated TCP Options Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
UPnP Malformed Advert. Attempted administrator access or denial of service 
SNMP Request TCP & UDP Information gathering 
SNMP AgentX/TCP Request Ranges from Denial of Service (DoS) to code execution 
Web-PHP Setup.php access Possible execution of arbitrary code and unauthorized administrative access to the target system 
Web Misc. robots.txt access Information gathering for potential control of the web server 
FTP Traffic Encrypted Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
Invalid FTP Command Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
Telnet command on FTP 
command channel Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
Bare Bite U-Encoding Possible attempt to evade the IDS 
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SNORT ALERTS – IT NETWORK 
 
Alert Impact 
FTP Passwd Retrieval Attempt Attacker may obtain a valid list of user names and/or encrypted passwords from the server 
POP3 PASS format string 
attempt 
Successful format string attack could result in the execution of 
arbitrary code with the same privileges as the user running the 
POP daemon 
WEB-PHP Setup.php access Possible execution of arbitrary code and unauthorized administrative access to the target system 
Finger null request 
Information gathering. Some systems will respond to a null 
finger request with a list of usernames present on the host 
Finger remote command 
execution attempt 
The attacker may be presented with the opportunity to run a 
command of his choice on the target UNIX system 
Finger remote command pipe 
execution attempt 
The attacker may be presented with the opportunity to run a 
command of his choice on the target UNIX system 
SNMP AgentX/TCP Request Ranges from Denial of Service (DoS) to code execution 
SNMP Request TCP Information gathering 
SNMP Trap TCP Information gathering 
WEB-CGI awstats access  Possible execution of system commands 
Finger 0 query Attacker may obtain information about user accounts on the target system 
Finger redirection attempt Attacker may obtain information about a third party host without making a direct connection to that host 
FTP port bounce attempt Unauthorized access to the target host. Information disclosure 
WEB-FRONTPAGE shtml.exe 
access 
Information gathering and system integrity compromise. 
Possible unauthorized admin access to the server or 
application. Possible execution of arbitrary code of the 
attackers choosing in some cases. Denial of service is 
possible. 
WEB-FRONTPAGE /_vti_bin/ 
access 
Information gathering and system integrity compromise. 
Possible unauthorized admini access to the server or 
application. Possible execution of arbitrary code of the 
attackers choosing in some cases. Denial of service 
41 
Alert Impact 
WEB-MISC Linksys router default 
user name and password login 
attempt 
Information gathering and system integrity compromise. 
Possible unauthorized admin access to server or application. 
WEB-MISC robots.txt access Information gathering for potential control of the web server 
FTP bounce attempt Denial of service. Information disclosure. Loss of integrity 
Telnet CMD on FTP Command 
channel Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
TCP Window Scale Option found 
with length > 14 Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
Double Decoding attack Possible attempt to evade an IDS 
WEB-ROOT Directory Traversal Directory traversal outside the root directory of a web server 
TCP Portscans and Portsweeps Normally indicative of network reconnaissance and potential future targeted attack. 
WARNING: ICMP Original IP 
Fragmented and Offset Not 0! Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
ATTACK RESPONSES 403 
Forbidden Information gathering 
Finger version query Information gathering 
ICMP Destination Unreachable 
communication with Destination 
Host is Administratively 
Prohibited 
Generates informational events about the network. 
ICMP Superscan Echo Information gathering 
WEB-FRONTPAGE author.exe 
access 
Attacker can modify web content, access privileged files or 
modify other users’ privileges on the Frontpage-enabled 
virtual host 
WEB-MISC .htaccess access If successful, this request could provide an attacker with valuable information needed to compromise the website 
MISC MS Terminal Server 
Request 
Sending repeated requests may cause denial of service by 
consuming all available memory resources 
MISC MS Terminal Server 
Request RDP Denial of service 
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Alert Impact 
DNS Large number of NX 
DOMAIN replies – possible DNS 
Cache poisoning 
Denial of service. Information disclosure. Loss of integrity. 
Complete admin access 
Telnet Traffic Encrypted Indication of anomalous behavior between networked assets 
 
  
43 
MODBUS VULNERABILITIES 
 Force Listen Only Mode  
Summary An attacker can force a PLC into listen only mode by issuing the 08 Diagnostics 
function code with a sub-function code of 04, Force Listen Only Mode 
Description Modbus TCP is a protocol commonly used in SCADA and DCS networks for 
process control. Force Listen Only Mode places a PLC or any other Modbus 
server in an inactive state. Commands are not acted on, and responses are not 
generated. The device will only respond after power up which can be activated 
remotely via the 08 Diagnostics function code with a sub-function code of 01 
Restart Communications 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity and a Modbus client simulator could send Force 
Listen Mode commands to important PLC’s. An attacker could send Force 
Listen Mode commands to all PLC’s to create a state of chaos. 
Corrective 
Action 
Send the Restart Communications Modbus TCP request to affected PLC’s and 
identify where the commands came from to prevent future attacks.  Restart Communications Option 
Summary An attacker can force a PLC or other Modbus TCP server to power cycle via 
function code 08, sub function 01. 
Description Restart Communications forces a restart and power up self-tests. The PLC will 
be unavailable during the power up process. An attacker could send this 
Modbus TCP request repeatedly in a denial of service attack. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity could cause PLC’s and other MODBUS servers 
to be unavailable for short periods of time by sending the Restart 
Communications sub-function code. An attacker could send this MODBUS 
request message repeatedly to force continuous reboots. 
False 
Positives 
Occasionally there is a need to restart communications. This command could be 
issued to restart a system that has hung or for other troubleshooting issues. 
  
44 Clear Counters and Diagnostic Registers 
Summary An attacker erases the counters and diagnostics in an effort to hide attack 
information or increase the time to recover from an attack 
Description An attacker can remove audit data from a Modbus server by issuing the 08 
Diagnostics function code with a sub-function code of 0A, Clear Counters and 
Diagnostic Registers. By clearing the counters and diagnostic registers an 
attacker may be able to avoid detection 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity could cause PLC’s and other MODBUS servers 
to clear their counters and diagnostic registers by sending a request message 
with function code 08 and sub-function code 0A. 
False 
Positives 
Occasionally there is a need to clear counters and diagnostic registers. 
Corrective 
Action 
Identify where the commands came from to prevent future attacks. 
 Read Device Identification 
Summary An attacker learns the vendor, product, version number and other information 
about a PLC or other MODBUS server 
Description A MODBUS request packet with function code 43 Read Device Identification will 
cause a MODBUS server to return the vendor name, product name, and version 
number. Additional information may also be provided in optional fields. 
Attack 
Scenarios 
An attacker with IP connectivity sends a Modbus request packet with function 
code 43 to all systems in the network and gathers intelligence that may be 
helpful in future attacks. 
False 
Positives 
Occasionally there is a legitimate need to request this information. 
Corrective 
Action 
Identify if this is the reconnaissance phase of an attack and take the appropriate 
action to prevent subsequent attacks based on this information.   
45 Report Server Information 
Summary An attacker gains information on a PLC or other Modbus server by issuing the 
function code 17 Report Slave ID request. 
Description A Modbus request packed with function code 11 Report Slave ID will generate a 
response that can include information about the Modbus server device in 
addition to the ID. The information provided is device specific. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity sends a Modbus request packet with function 
code 11 to all systems in the network and gathers intelligence that may be 
helpful in future attacks. 
False 
Positives 
Occasionally there is a need to request this information. 
Corrective 
Action 
Identify if this is the reconnaissance phase of an attack and take the appropriate 
action to prevent subsequent attacks based on this information.  Unauthorized Read Request to a PLC 
Summary An unauthorized Modbus client attempts to read information from a PLC or other 
field device. 
Description The Modbus protocol does not provide authentication of the source of a request. 
Most SCADA/DCS networks have a limited number of HMI or other control 
devices that should read information from a PLC. An adversary may attempt to 
gather information on the system being controlled and the PLC. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity to the PLC issues Modbus read requests. This 
may be the reconnaissance phase of an attack and advance warning of 
something more serious to follow. This same attack method may be used as 
part of a denial of service attack against a PLC or a TCP/serial communication 
gateway. 
False 
Positives 
A new authorized Modbus client, typically a HMI or control server, may be added 
to the system and issue authorized read commands. 
Corrective 
Action 
Deploy access control lists or firewalls to limit access to authorized IP 
addresses. 
  
46 Unauthorized Write Request to a PLC 
Summary An unauthorized Modbus client attempts to write information to a PLC or other 
field device. 
Description An adversary may attempt to corrupt a PLC or set in a state to negatively affect 
the process being controlled. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with IP connectivity to the PLC issues MODBUS write requests. This 
could change the configuration of the PLC, make the PLC interoperable, or send 
requests to actuators to change the state of the process being controlled. 
False 
Positives 
A new authorized Modbus client, typically a HMI or control server, may be added 
to the system and issue authorized read commands. 
Corrective 
Action 
Deploy access control lists or firewalls to limit access to authorized IP 
addresses.  Illegal Packet Size, Possible DOS Attack 
Summary A Modbus TCP packet that exceeds the maximum length for the protocol. 
Description Modbus limits the size of the PDU to 253 bytes to allow the packet to be sent on 
a serial line, RS-485 interface. Modbus TCP prepends a 7-byte MODBUS 
Application Protocol (MBAP) header to the PDU, and the MBAP_PDU is 
encapsulated in a TCP packet. This places an upper limit on legal packet size. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker creates a specially crafted packet longer than 260 bytes and sends 
it to a Modbus client or server. If the client or server were programmed 
incorrectly this could lead to a successful buffer overflow or denial of service 
attack. 
False 
Negatives 
The corresponding Snort rule identifies packets greater than 300 bytes to allow 
for the TCP overhead. It is possible to send a packet slightly longer than allowed 
that may not trigger this alert, but this packet should not be long enough to 
create a buffer overflow attack. 
Corrective 
Action 
Drop the connection with a TCP reset and investigate the system sending the 
packet. 
  
47 Non Modbus Communication on TCP Port 502 
Summary An established connection between a HMI or control server and a PLC is 
hijacked or spoofed to send other attacks to either device. 
Description Modbus TCP includes a two byte protocol identifier in the Modbus application 
protocol (MBAP). The pertinent Snort rule verifies this identifier is correct. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker can exploit the holes in a firewall or router acl that allow Modbus 
TCP communication to establish or hijack TCP sessions. Reconnaissance or 
attacks sent to a Modbus client or Modbus server are likely to not be properly 
formatted Modbus requests or responses. 
False 
Negatives 
An adversary could include the Modbus TCP protocol identifier field in all 
communication. 
Corrective 
Action 
Identify where the spoofed packets came from to prevent future attacks. 
 Slave Device Busy Exception Code Delay 
Summary An attacker postpones action or an alarm by sending an exception code 06 
Slave Devices Busy in an exception response message. The threshold is set to 
3 times in 60 seconds. 
Description When a Modbus request is issued, a valid Modbus response is expected back 
within a system selected timeout period. By sending an exception response 
message with an exception code of 06 Slave Device Busy, an attacker can 
prevent the timeout condition and resulting alarm. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with physical or logical access to a PLC intercepts or blocks 
MODBUS requests to the PLC and responds with an exception response 
message with an exception code of 06 Slave Device Busy. This will allow the 
attacker additional time to modify the PLC or other field systems and avoid 
detection. 
False 
Positives 
A Modbus request to a PLC or other Modbus server that was busy processing 
long duration commands. 
Correction 
Action 
Perform onsite analysis of the problem if possible. Consider moving to backup 
communication for key system functions. 
  
48 Acknowledge Exception Code Delay 
Summary An attacker postpones action or an alarm by sending an exception code 05 
Acknowledge in an exception response message. The threshold is set to 3 times 
in 60 seconds. 
Description When a Modbus request is issued, a valid Modbus response is expected back 
within a system selected timeout period. By sending an exception response 
message with an exception code of 05 Acknowledge, an attacker can prevent 
the timeout condition and resulting alarm. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker with physical or logical access to a PLC intercepts or blocks 
MODBUS requests to the PLC and responds with an exception response 
message with an exception code of 05 Acknowledge. This will allow the attacker 
additional time to modify the PLC or other field systems and avoid detection. 
Corrective 
Action 
Perform onsite analysis of the problem if possible. Consider moving to backup 
communication for key system functions.  Points List Scan 
Summary An attacker determines what Modbus TCP data points are available in the 
reconnaissance phase of an attack. 
Description Read and write requests are issued to a Modbus TCP server to address points 
which can be individual bits (coils and discrete inputs) or bytes (registers). 
These points represent measurements or control of a physical process. If a read 
or write request is made to an address that is not configured in the Modbus TCP 
server the server will respond with an error function code and exception code 
02. It is an unusual error for an authorized HMI or server to issue a read or write 
request to an address that is not configured. The appropriate Snort rule will 
trigger when 5 exception code 02 responses are received in 30 seconds. This is 
likely to happen if an attacker is attempting to recover the points list by scanning 
all possible points in the reconnaissance phase of an attack 
Attack 
Scenarios 
An attacker will run an automated Modbus TCP scanner to determine what 
addresses are supported in a Modbus TCP server to help plan an attack. 
False 
Positives 
The corresponding Snort rule may trigger during Modbus TCP client or server 
installation or modification. False positives are also positive with significant 
changes to a points list. 
Corrective 
Action 
Deploy access control lists or firewalls to limit access to authorized IP 
addresses. 
49 Incorrect Packet Length 
Summary The Modbus TCP packet is a different length than defined by the length 
parameter in the Modbus Application Protocol (MBAP). 
Description The two byte packet length field is part of the MBAP. An inexperienced attacker 
may forget to modify this field or modify it incorrectly as they add or remove data 
to a packet 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker may attempt to corrupt data integrity by adding or removing data to 
a Modbus request or response packet. 
Corrective 
Action 
Drop the connection with a TCP reset. 
 Function Code Scan 
Summary An attacker determines what Modbus TCP function codes are available in the 
reconnaissance phase of an attack. 
Description A function code is included in each request that determines the type of request 
such as read, write, or administrative. If the Modbus TCP server does not 
support the function code it will respond with an error function code and 
exception code 01. It is an unusual error for an authorized HMI or server to issue 
a function code request that is not supported. Some vendors support vendor-
specific function codes so the result of a function code scan could allow an 
attacker to identify the field equipment vendor and model. The corresponding 
Snort rule will trigger when 3 exception code 01 responses are received in 60 
seconds. This is likely to happen if an attacker is attempting to see what type of 
device and function code support is available in the reconnaissance phase of an 
attack. 
Attack 
Scenario 
An attacker will run an automated Modbus TCP scanner to determine what 
function codes are supported in a Modbus TCP server to help plan an attack. 
False 
Positives 
The corresponding Snort rule may trigger during Modbus TCP client or server 
installation or functional modification. 
Corrective 
Action 
Deploy access control lists or firewalls to limit access to authorized IP 
addresses. 
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INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE VIRTUAL PLC HONEYNET‡ 
1. Install your favorite Linux package as your host OS. The Linux package used for this 
thesis was Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.5 (PLC Honeynet images will run on a 32-bit 
computer). Install in text mode so you can manually assign IP and gateway addresses. 
Set the IP address of the physical eth0 interface to the honeynet management address 
and use this interface for initial network connectivity 
2. Log in to the host computer and type ‘startx’ at the command line to bring up the GUI. 
Make sure you can connect to the Internet from the host. The DNS server address 
should be listed in /etc/resolv.conf and the gateway in the route table should be set to 
the router.  
3. Go to the /etc/selinux/config file and edit ‘SELINUX=enforcing’ to ‘SELINUX=disabled’ 
4. Navigate to http://www.vmware.com and download VMware Server for Linux. The 
download is free but does require registration. There will be a variety of binaries 
available for download. Make note of the VMware Server Product License at the top of 
the page. Select and download the desired binary. The binary used in this thesis was 
VMware Server 2 for Linux Operating Systems (.gz). Copy the tar file to the /tmp 
directory on the host and extract the files. Run the install file. 
tar –xzvf Vmware_file_name.tar.gz 
5. The virtual network setting will need to be changed to what is shown below. The rest of 
the system specific setting can remain at their defaults [ ], only the network parameters 
will be changed. Accept the default by hitting the Enter key or type your response. 
Creating a new VMware Server installer database using the tar4 format. 
Installing VMware Server 
In which directory do you want to install the binary files? [/usr/bin] /usr/bin  
What is the directory that contains the init directories (rc0.d/ to rc6/d)? [/etc/rc.d] /etc/rc.d 
What is the directory that contains the init scripts? [/etc/rc.d/init.d] /etc/rc.d/init.d 
In which directory do you want to install the daemon files? [/usr/sbin] /usr/sbin 
In which directory do you want to install the library files? [/usr/lib/vmware] 
The path “/usr/lib/vmware” does not exist currently. This program is going to create it, including           
needed parent directories. Is that what you want? [yes] yes 
In which directory do you want to install the manual files? [/usr/share/man] /usr/share/man                                                    ‡ These installation instructions are an updated and expanded version of the original implementation instructions available on Digital Bond’s website.  
51 
In which directory do you want to install the documentation files? [/usr/share/doc/vmware] / 
usr/share/doc/vmware 
The path “/usr/share/doc/vmware” does not exist currently. This program is going to create it, 
including needed parent directories. Is this what you want? [yes] yes 
Before running VMware Server for the first time, you need to configure it by invoking the following 
command: “/usr/bin/vmware-config.pl”. Do you want this program to invoke the command for you 
now? [yes] yes 
You must read and accept the End User License Agreement to continue. Press enter to display it. 
Do you accept? (yes/no) yes  
Thank you. 
The bld-2.6.18-8.el5-i686smp-RHEL5 – vmmon module loads perfectly into the running kernel. 
The bld-2.6.18-8.el5-i686smp-RHEL5 – vmci module loads perfectly into the running kernel. 
The bld-2.6.18-8.el5-i686smp-RHEL5 – vmsock module loads perfectly into the running kernel. 
Do you want networking for your virtual machines? (yes/no/help) [yes] 
Please specify a name for this network. [Bridged] Bridged 
Do you want to be able to use NAT networking in your virtual machines? (yes/no) [yes] no 
Do you want this program to probe for an unused private subnet? (yes/no/help) [yes] no 
What will be the IP address of your host on the private network? (type the IP address) 
What will be the  netmask of your private network? (type the netmask) 
Do you want to be able to use host-only networking in your virtual machines? [yes] yes 
Configuring a host-only network for vmnet1. 
Please specify a name for this network [HostOnly] HostOnly 
Do you want this program to probe for an unused private subnet? (yes/no/help) [yes] no 
What will be the IP address of your host on the private network? 10.0.0.0 
What will be the netmask of your private network? Enter netmask 
The following host-only networks have been defined: 
• vmnet1 is a host-only network on private subnet 10.0.0.0 
Do you wish to configure another host-only network? (yes/no) [no] yes 
Please specify a name for this network [HostOnly] HostOnly2 
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Do you want this program to probe for an unused private subnet? (yes/no/help) [yes] no 
What will be the IP address of your host on the private network? 172.16.1.0 
What will be the netmask of your private network? Enter netmask 
The following host-only networks have been defined: 
• vmnet1 is a host-only network on private subnet 10.0.0.0 
• vmnet2 is a host-only network on private subnet 172.16.1.0 
Do you wish to configure another host-only network? (yes/no) [no] no 
The bld-2.6.18-8.el5-i686smp-RHEL5 – vmnet module loads perfectly into the running kernel. 
Please specify a port for remote connections to use [902] 902 
Please specify a  port for standard http connections to use [8222] 8222 
Please specify a port for secure http (https) connections to use [8333] 8333 
The current administrative user for VMware Server is ‘ ‘. Would you like to specify a different 
administrator? [no] yes 
Please specify the user whom you wish to be the VMware Server administrator. root 
Using root as the VMware Server administrator. 
In which directory do you want to keep your virtual machine files? [/var/lib/vmware/Virtual 
Machines] /var/lib/vmware/Virtual Machines 
The path “/var/lib/vmware/Virtual Machines” does not exist currently. This program is going to 
create it, including needed parent directories. Is this what you want? [yes] yes 
Please enter your 28-character serial number. 
Type XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX-XXXXX or ‘Enter’ to cancel:  
Creating a new VMware VIX API installer database using the tar4 format. 
Installing VMware VIX API 
In which directory do you want to install the VMware VIX API binary files? [/usr/bin] /usr/bin 
In which directory do you want to install the VMware VIX API library files? [/usr/lib/vmware-vix/lib] 
/usr/lib/vmware-vix/lib 
The path “/usr/lib/vmware-vix/lib” does not exist currently. This program is going to create it 
including needed parent directories. Is this what you want? [yes] yes 
In which directory do you want to install the VMware VIX API document pages? 
[/usr/share/doc/vmware-vix] /usr/share/doc/vmware-vix 
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The path “/usr/share/doc/vmware-vix” does not exist currently. This program is going to create it, 
including needed parent directories. Is this what you want? [yes] yes 
The installation of VMware VIX API 1.6.2 build-203138 for Linux completed successfully. You can 
decide to remove this software from your system at any time by invoking the following command: 
“/usr/bin/vmware-uninstall-vix.pl”. 
 
6. Set permissions so a bridge will operate correctly when run as a virtual machine. 
        chmod a+rw /dev/vmnet* 
7. Download the Virtual Machines from the Digital Bond subscriber site to the 
/var/lib/vmware/Virtual\Machines/ directory. Access to the Virtual Machines requires free 
registration. 
8. After the VMs are downloaded, you will need to uncompress them. This will expand the 
disk images, configuration files, and empty log files utilized by the virtual machines. 
9. Download and install VMware Server Console. Windows and Linux versions of the 
console are available from the VMware website. The binary for Linux can be 
downloaded from ‘http://download3.vmware.com/software/ vmserver/VMware-mui-1.0.6-
91891.tar.gz’. Run the vmware-install.pl script in /vmware-server-console-distrib and 
accept all defaults. Be sure to also run the vmware-mui install script as well.  
10. Confirm that /etc/selinux/config still says ‘SELINUX=disabled’. Reboot. Connect to the 
VMware Server from the VMware Server console by opening a browser and entering 
‘http://localhost:8222’ into the URL field.  If the secure connection fails because of an 
invalid security certificate, click on the “Or you can add an exception…” link. Login with 
username and password selected during setup. 
11. From the VMWare Server Interface, select ‘Add Virtual Machine from Inventory’. In the 
dialog box that opens, click on ‘standard’ under the host name. The two VMs will appear. 
Select the Honeywall VM and the file that appears in the Contents pane. Click OK. Start 
the Honeywall VM from the VMware console interface. Wait for the OS to completely 
boot before continuing to the next step. 
12. Start the Target VM from the VMware console interface. Wait for the OS to completely 
boot before continuing to the next step.  
13. Set the IP address on eth0 interface of the Target VM to the address that will be 
exposed to attackers. 
14. Log into both VMs and change the default passwords. The default accounts and 
passwords are as follows: (Notes say I needed to install VMware Remote Console first) 
• Target VM 
o User “digitalbond” with sudo privileges with a default password of 
“abc123” 
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o Root password is “abc123” 
• Honeywall VM 
o User “roo” with password of “Abc123!”  
o (You must log in as roo first. Once you’re logged in as roo, you can log in 
as root by typing ‘su – root’ at the command line). 
o Root password is “abc123” 
o Walleye Web Interface Credentials, User: roo, Password: Abc123!!! 
o SSH Port is TCP/2222 
15. IMPORTANT:  As configured, the Target VM will act as a rogue DHCP server. It is 
critical that this function be disabled to prevent denial of service to others. This can be 
accomplished by going to the /etc/vmware/locations file on the host machine. All 
occurrences of ‘VNET_1_DHCP yes’ in this file should be changed to ‘VNET_1_DHCP 
no’. There are multiple occurrences of this line so be sure to modify them all. After 
modifying the file, restart the host with the command ‘/etc/init.d/vmware restart’ 
16. Consider providing the ability for the VMs to reach the Internet on an intranet via the 
management interface to get updates or mail out alerts. This will require NAT on the 
VMs management interface. 
17. Incoming traffic from the physical eth1 interface is expected to be forwarded to 10.0.0.5, 
Honeyd will process all traffic and route services appropriately. 
18. The Walleye web interface for the Honeywall requires a SSH tunnel to the eth0 physical 
interface and then port forwarding to the SSL port on the virtual Honeywall. If you have a 
Linux SSH client, try the following commands: 
ssh –N –p 22 eth0_ip –L 5443/172.16.1.2/443 (where eth0_ip is the physical eth0 
address). Then browse to https://localhost:5443. 
19. You can log into the Walleye web interface by opening a browser and typing 
https://localhost:5443. Walleye should be able to connect to the Internet.  
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